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Abstract. While Internet voting has a potential of improving the demo-
cratic processes, it introduces new challenges to the security of the election,
such as the possibility of voter coercion due to voting in uncontrolled en-
vironments. Cryptographic research has resulted in a number of proposals
for protecting against such coercion with the help of counter-strategies
that can be used by the voter to convince the coercer that they obeyed
their instructions while secretly voting for another voting option. So far,
these proposals have been theoretical, and their usability in terms of
ability of the voter to apply the counter-strategies in practice has not been
thoroughly investigated. We conducted a literature review to identify the
available counter-strategies and assumptions on voters’ capabilities. We
evaluated the identified assumptions and conclude a number of usability
issues. We provide recommendations on further research directions and
practical considerations in designing coercion resistant voting systems
are provided.
1 Introduction
With the ongoing digitalization of society, Internet voting has often been discussed
as a way to facilitate democratic processes. These discussions are furthermore
more prominent in 2020 given the ongoing pandemic, as many argue, making
remote voting a necessary option to protect the population. Several countries,
e.g. Estonia and Switzerland, introduced Internet voting as an additional voting
channel in order to improve convenience for the voters and support voters who
would otherwise be unable to get to a polling station. However, introducing
technology in electoral processes also introduced new risks, in particular, risks
connected with security and privacy. One of these risks is the possibility of
voter coercion, stemming from the fact that the voting occurs in an uncontrolled
environment where voter privacy and, correspondingly, the secrecy of the ballot
is no longer guaranteed. An adversary who is physically present next to the voter
while they cast their vote – for example, a household member or a supervisor at
work – would be able to ensure that the voter casts the vote they are instructed
to cast. Even a remote coercer could instruct the voter to reveal which voting
option they voted for, for example, by requesting the voter to prepare and send
a recording of the voting procedure.
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In order to prevent such attacks, a number of works in the e-voting community
focused on developing schemes for the voting systems with the so-called coercion
resistance property, see e.g. [1, 5, 28]. A scheme that is coercion resistant aims to
protect voters’ privacy even if the adversary can actively communicate with the
voter and coerce them to reveal secret information or to behave in a certain way.
A related concept is receipt-freeness, which specifically focuses on preventing the
voter from creating a receipt that would prove to the adversary how they voted.
One of the ways the schemes satisfy coercion resistance and/or receipt-freeness
is via the so-called counter-strategy. The idea is, that the voter pretends to
follow the coercer’s instructions, while secretly following a different procedure
that allows them to vote for their preferred voting option. The counter-strategy
succeeds if the coercer is not able to tell whether it has been applied, or whether
the voter has voted as instructed.
While the underlying cryptographic mechanisms of the proposed schemes can
guarantee the success of a counter-strategy under the defined security model, it
is still crucial to ensure that the voter is capable of performing them correctly.
Usability therefore becomes a fundamental issue. While a number of works have
investigated usability and other human factors in e-voting (see e.g. [37, 46]),
only a few have considered the actions required by the voter to ensure coercion
resistance from the usability point of view [42,43]. These studies have pointed
that the counter-strategies proposed by investigated systems rely on complicated
concepts not understandable by the voter and on complex actions required from
the voter. As these studies focused on the evaluation of a specific voting scheme
and its implementation, no systematic investigation on the available counter-
strategies from a variety of systems has been done yet. The general practical issues
of coercion resistant voting systems are studied by Krips and Willemson [33],
however, their work does not focus on human factors of such systems.
This paper describes the results of a conducted literature review to identify the
counter-strategies available in voting literature on the topic of coercion resistance.
We study the assumptions regarding the voter capabilities in applying these
counter-strategies from the human factors point of view. We identify a number of
challenges in designing coercion resistant systems and provide recommendations
on addressing these challenges and future work directions.
2 Methodology
In order to identify the existing counter-strategies a search using keywords
”coercion resistance voting” and ”receipt-freeness voting” in SpringerLink, IEEE,
ACM and USENIX proceedings databases has been conducted. The search was
limited to papers in computer science written in English language that are in
open access from the authors’ institution. Additionally, a search using the same
keywords was performed in Google Scholar. From the search results, the papers
that propose an Internet voting scheme satisfying some variant of receipt-freeness
and/or coercion resistance were identified.
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Note, we do not include proposals for polling-place voting, as these assume
a controlled environment. We furthermore do not consider the proposals that
rely on security mechanisms other than counter-strategies (e.g. rerandomisation
of a vote by a voting system component [13] or relying on a tamper-resistant
device that does not reveal the encryption randomness to the voter [8]), since
these do not protect against an attacker that is either physically present or
demands a recording of the voting procedure from the voter. Furthermore, we
exclude the papers that focus on improving one specific part of the procedure
towards providing better protection against coercion (e.g. such as the individual
verification in the original proposal in Selene [49], or preventing disclosure from
published tally results in ShuffleSum [10]) without considering other steps of the
election procedure such as actual vote casting.
3 Results
A total of 51 papers were identified, containing the proposals that can be classified
into the following categories: fake credentials, deniable vote updating, vote mask-
ing and code voting. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of proposals in
each category. We explain the counter-strategies in each category in more detail,
considering the following coercion scenario. The adversary wants to coerce the
voter to cast a vote for Eve, while the voter attempts to cast a vote for Alice
instead3. In our description, we focus on human factors challenges and assump-
tions of the counter-strategies, referring to the work by Krips and Willemson [33]
for an overview of more technical assumptions or coercion resistant systems.
Counter-strategy Papers Total
Fake credentials [2–6,12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 27–29,32, 41, 43, 47, 48, 52–55,
57,58,61,65,66]
29
Deniable vote updating [11,14,20,25,34,36,38,39,44,45,56] 11
Masking [7, 17,26,30,31,50,59,62–64] 11
Table 1. Classification of scientific papers into counter strategies against voter coercion.
3.1 Fake credentials
By far the most popular counter-strategy relies on the existence of so-called fake
credentials. The idea behind the counter-strategy is as follows. Given a space of
available credentials C, the voter is provided with a unique and secret credential
3 Note, while other possible combinations of goals for both adversary and the voter
exist (for example, the voter might want to avoid voting for Eve without necessarily
casting a ballot for another candidate, or adversary might want to force the voter to
abstain instead of voting for a specific candidate), these are only briefly discussed
and are not in the focus of this paper.
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ĉ ∈ C during voter registration, so that the credential is distributed before the
election via an untappable channel. When voting, the voter uses the credential ĉ
to authenticate themselves to the voting system. If the voter is coerced, instead
of authenticating themselves with their real credential, they generate and use
a so-called fake credential c′ 6= ĉ. The fake credential is indistinguishable from
the real one by the adversary, and is accepted by the voting system without
outputting an authentication error. The votes submitted with the fake credential
are, however, are excluded from tallying. The voter then can cast a valid vote
for their preferred candidate when they are not being observed by the adversary.
In case the voter only wants to prevent voting for an adversarial candidate, no
further actions are required.
While some of the described schemes do not specify how the credentials are
stored, providing only a description of the protocol without going into practical
implementation aspects (e.g. [28]), others rely on storing various values such as
cryptographic secret keys on a tamper-resistant trusted device (see e.g. [43, 47].
The purpose of this device is to ensure, that neither an adversary nor the voter
themselves can get access to the information stored on it.
Human factors assumptions The success of the fake credential counter-
strategy depends on how secure these credentials are managed. This results in
the assumptions on voters’ behaviour as described below.
Inputting real credentials. The first assumption is crucial, first and foremost, for
the case when no coercion occurs and the voter simply wants to cast a vote for
their preferred candidate. In that case, they have to enter their real credential
into the system. They, however, would not be provided with any feedback from
the system, whether the credential is actually correct – after all, a potential
coercer who observes the voting would otherwise be able to tell whether the voter
obeys the adversary’s instructions or applies a counter-strategy. This assumption
is especially crucial in systems where any credential c ∈ C is admissible by the
system and treated as fake as long as c′ 6= ĉ – in such a case, any typo or other
mistake in entering the credential will result in casting an invalid vote, without
the voter knowing it.
One approach to facilitate this assumption relies on the so-called panic
passwords [15]. The idea is to use a separate type of credential that would allow
the voter to signal being coerced. Thus, each voter is assigned a set I ⊂ C of
admissible credentials, of which ĉ ∈ I is the only real credential that allows
casting a valid ballot. Whenever the voter authenticates themselves using any
value c ∈ C/I, the system outputs an authentication error. If the voter uses c′ ∈ I,
c′ 6= ĉ, the system treats c′ as a fake credential and the voter as coerced, and
accepts c′ without outputting any error. Using such an approach it is crucial to
define I in such a way that makes it unlikely that the voter mistakenly enters
another credential c′ ∈ I instead of c. The authors of [15] propose to define I
as any passphrase that consists of a given number of dictionary words. Such a
system is likely to protect against typos (especially if one excludes dictionary
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words that differ from each other by a single letter, and hence, prone to being
mixed up due to typos). However, it will not protect voters who do not remember
the passphrase exactly, for example, not being sure about the order of the words
in a passphrase. One can furthermore argue that panic passwords introduce
further usability issues: as such, it is crucial to ensure that the voters understand
the concept of panic passwords, namely, that out of many admissible passwords
available to them, only one can be used for casting a valid ballot. Finally, if the
voters are expected to generate their passwords themselves, it should be taken
into account that humans often find it difficult to come up with passwords that
are secure enough.
Generating fake credentials. A related assumption is required to ensure that
the coerced voters are capable of applying a counter-strategy without alerting
the adversary. This assumption might be easier to fulfill if the system accepts
any credential c′ ∈ C as a fake credential without outputting a warning. Still,
the voters need to be explained how and when they should do it. As with
panic passwords, generating a convincing fake credential would also get more
complicated if the voters are required to understand the rules of how panic
passwords are constructed and generate one accordingly.
3.2 Deniable vote updating
Another method of resisting coercion is the so-called deniable vote updating.
The idea is simple: while the voter might be coerced to cast a particular vote in
presence of an adversary, they can cast another vote, overwriting their previous
one, when the adversary is gone. This method, in particular, is relied upon
in real-world Internet voting in Estonia and was deployed in the Norwegian
Internet voting system between 2011 and 2013. The coercion resistance property,
in particular, is achieved due to deniability of vote updating – the adversary
should be unable to tell whether the voter has cast another vote, even if the voter
would try to prove that they did not do it. This deniability is achieved either
via restricting access to the election information, or via cryptographic solutions
that enable deniability while also publishing the cast ballots for verifiability.
As opposed to fake credentials-based systems, where the voting credentials are
generated and distributed as a part of the voting system and specifically designed
to be coercion resistant, systems based on deniable vote updating assume that an
existing infrastructure is used for authenticating the voters. Such an infrastructure
can be implemented via tamper-resistant trusted hardware tokens, such as smart
cards in Estonia. Forwarding those types of authentication material could have
severe impact to voters beyond the voting process, which lowers the risk of
forwarding voting materials.
A variant of deniable vote updating is a so-called flexible vote updating. As
opposed to simple vote updating that follows the last-vote-counts policy, the final
ballot that is included in the tally is calculated as a function of all the ballots cast
by the voter in the election, expressed by a function F (v1, ..., vn). One example of
such function is the proposal in [11,36], which sets F (v1, ..., vk) =
∑k
i=1 vi. In this
6 Oksana Kulyk and Stephan Neumann
way, the system ensures protection against last-minute attacks that might occur if
the adversary demands that the voter casts their vote during the very last minute
of the voting phase of the election, either observing the voter while they do so
(including remote observation or recordings of the voting procedure provided
by the voter), or checking the public election information for the ballots posted
by the voter. In that case, if the voter is coerced to cast a vote for vEve using
the system with flexible vote updating, they cast a ballot for v′ = vAlice − vEve
beforehand, so that their final ballot is computed as v′ + vEve = vAlice.
Human factors assumptions An advantage of the deniable vote updating
strategy is its initial simplicity: if the voter is not coerced, the vote casting process
is no different from simpler voting systems that do not ensure coercion resistance.
Even in case of coercion, the concept of voting again in order to overwrite the
vote cast under coercion would most probably fit into the mental models of the
voters. The simple vote updating strategy therefore only relies on one assumption:
Make sure to vote after (or before) coercion. As opposed to fake credentials
approach, the deniable vote updating strategy requires the voter to take additional
action in order to make sure that the adversarial vote will not be counted. Thus,
in addition to ensuring that the voter has such a possibility by being free from
adversarial observation, the voter should also keep in mind that they need to go
through the voting process again at some point. More complexity, however, is
introduced if the flexible vote updating is used. Namely, the following assumptions
becomes of crucial importance:
Remember all the votes cast in the election. At the moment of casting their vote,
the voter should keep track of all the votes cast in the election, including votes
that they might be coerced to cast in the future.
Calculate values to cast. The voter should be able to calculate the value they
should cast in order to get their preferred vote to be counted; that is, given
v1, ..., vk−1 as the votes cast in the election, the voter should be able to calculate
vk so that F (v1, ..., vk) = vAlice.
Input vk. Once the value vk is calculated, the voter has to input it without
making any errors.
Similar to the fake credentials strategy, the system would not be able to
output all the previously cast votes on voter’s request or provide any feedback
on the resulting value F (v1, ..., vk) upon casting vk without violating coercion
resistance. Note, that the consequences in making a mistake in inputting vk are
even more severe than in the fake credential counter-strategy when voting in
absence of coercion. While failing to input a correct credential can only in casting
an invalid ballot that will not be counted, choosing a wrong value vk can in worst
case result in a final ballot v = F (v1, ..., vk) that will be counted as a valid vote
for one of the candidates in the election other than Alice.
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Note also, that much of this complexity can be hidden behind the user interface
of the voting client; as such, the system with flexible vote updating can be modified
into the system with simple vote updating, if the voting client stores all the votes
v1, ..., vk−1 cast so far, and casts a value vk so that F (v1, ..., vk) = vAlice if the
voter inputs “Alice” as their choice in the user interface. Such a modification,
however, will make the system vulnerable to last-minute coercion. A possible
solution would be to let the voter choose between simple and flexible vote updating
in an election, by offering to download two different voting clients; this, however,
would require further computer literacy from the voter, as well as the ability to
understand the difference between the offered choices.
3.3 Masking
As opposed to fake credentials and deniable vote updating counter-strategies that
are aimed at nullifying the vote cast in presence of an adversary (with a possibility
to change it to a vote for the voter’s preferred candidate), masking enables the
voter to cast their preferred vote for Alice while letting the adversary think that
the same cast vote is a vote for Eve. The idea is, that before the election, the
system commits to a secret masking value b ∈ B and shares it with the voter.
When casting the vote, the voter utilises a function M : B × V → V to submit a
masked ballot vM = M(b, vAlice), from which the value vAlice = M
−1(vm, b) will
be extracted by the voting system. A voter who is coerced would, correspondingly,
cast the same masked ballot vM and provide the coercer with a fake masking
value b′ selected such as vM = M(b
′, vEve). Different variants of masking strategy
have been proposed, such as using Zn as a set of possible votes vm and using a
one time pad b ∈ Zn with M(v, b) := v + b, using permutation π of candidate
list v1, ...vL, with b = (π(1), ..., π(L)) and M(vi, b) := π(i) or using a code list
b = x1, ..., xL with a unique code assigned to each one of the candidates v1, ..., vL
and M(vi, b) := xi (the so-called code voting).
Human factor assumptions The main assumption crucial for the masking
counter-strategy is the voter being able to calculate the value vm that results in
a vote for an intended candidate (i.e. so that M−1(vm, b) = vAlice). This results
in the following assumptions:
Recalling b. While the voter does not have to manually input the masking value
during vote casting, they are expected to recall it correctly in order to perform
the calculation of M(vAlice, b).
Calculating M(vAlice, b). Even if the voter remembers b, they are still expected
to calculate the masked ballot that corresponds to their intended vote b.
Input vm. Finally, once the value vm = M(vAlice, b) is calculated, the voter has
to input it without making any errors.
Similar to the fake credential counter-strategy, the voting system would not
output any feedback regarding M−1(vm, b) for a cast vm. Similar to the deniable
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vote updating strategy, failing to cast a correct masked ballot, due to mistakes
either in recalling b or in calculating or inputting vm can in worst case result in
a vote being cast for another candidate that will be counted in the tally.
As one way to mitigate this assumption, the scheme in [7] proposes to use
a mobile app that receives and outputs the value b from the voting system
as the voter starts the voting process. As discussed above, such an approach
requires a trusted mobile device and does not protect against a physically present
coercer. Another solution is the code voting approach that uses paper code
sheets containing printed codes for each candidate, e.g. with xAlice and xEve
corresponding to votes for Alice and Eve respectively. The idea is that the voter
reads the code of their chosen candidate during vote casting, without having to
recall it from memory. Similar to the app approach, the voter would be vulnerable
against physically present adversary. However, assuming that the voter can print
fake code sheets by themselves and expects the coercer to force them to vote
for Eve, they could switch the codes on the fake sheets, setting x′Alice = xEve
and x′Eve = xAlice. Yet another way to ensure that the cast masked ballot is the
same vote that the voter intended to cast is the use of so-called return codes.
The idea is to assign a code r1, ..., rL to each candidate, and provide the return
code sheets with codes printed on paper to the voter. After receiving a ballot
with a vote for a candidate vi, the voting system outputs a code ri to the voter,
which they should compare to the code on their return code sheet. While the
use of return codes is commonly used to protect against malicious voting device,
it can also be used as a help for the voter to ensure that they input the correct
masked ballot. In order to avoid coercion, however, the voter would have to fake
the return code sheet, assuming a certain level of computer skills.
4 Discussion
Following the description of counter-strategies and their related assumptions, we
discuss the human factors related with applying the counter-strategies and make
recommendations on designing coercion resistant systems.
4.1 Identified human factors and challenges
As the discussion of different counter-strategies revealed, there is a number of
issues related to human factors that need to be addressed for ensuring proper
use of coercion resistant voting systems, with some of these issues known from
usable security research in other domains (see e.g. [51, 60]). These issues can be
clustered as follows.
Unrealistic assumptions The complexity of the proposed counter-strategies
is a significant issue that could potentially prevent the voters from applying
these counter-strategies correctly. As such, they tend to require capabilities
that are difficult or impossible to attain, such as being able to remember long,
random-looking credentials or to input them on their first try without any errors.
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While these limitations have been acknowledged in previous research, often by
the authors of the proposed schemes, the suggested methods to aid the voters in
their task either had to rely on additional security assumptions such as trusted
hardware, or introduced further complexity for the voters.
Self-efficacy issues Even if the voters are actually capable to apply a counter-
strategy, a seeming complexity of the process might still discourage them from
it. This leads to lack of self-efficacy: even if the system actually provides ways
for the voters to protect themselves against coercion, the voters might still feel
helpless and unable to do so. Such lack of self-efficacy has been identified as an
issue in other aspects of electronic voting that require actions from the voter that
are unfamiliar to them from paper-based voting, such as verifying the integrity
of one’s cast vote [37]). This issue, however, might be even more crucial for
coercion resistance, since the voter is under additional stress from coercion and
the consequences of failure are potentially higher. If the voter tries to apply
a counter-strategy and fails, they might face repercussions from the adversary.
Even in the vote buying scenario, where the voter does not suffer any negative
repercussions, but instead does not get his pay from the adversary, the voter
might consider it a more rational decision to obey the adversary, if they do not
see their vote as valuable enough.
Limited interactive feedback As opposed to voting in general, the system
cannot provide feedback on the status of vote casting (e.g. whether the voter is
applying a counter-strategy or not). All the explanations and voter instructions
have to be provided in a non-interactive form, that is, they should not depend
on the actions of the voter and whether they apply the counter-strategy.
Trust and acceptance Even in absence of coercion, the voters have to change
their vote casting procedure, often to incorporate non-intuitive elements, such
as entering a masked value instead of their vote, having to remember all the
previously cast votes when updating, or remembering and distinguishing between
different kinds of credentials. If explicit instructions to avoid coercion are provided,
the voter might be altered and distrust the system. On the other hand, mentions
of increased security of the system might make the voters accept the system more,
once they are provided an explanation of the risks that are present in Internet
voting and that the system is designed to protect against (see [35, 40] for related
studies on the concept of cast-as-intended verifiability).
4.2 Recommendations
Considering the identified human factors and challenges, we propose a set of
recommendations for future implementations of coercion resistant voting systems.
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Involve the user Involving the user in the development of security-critical
systems has been widely recommended in usable security research, including
research on usability of electronic voting systems [46]. This is especially relevant
when the assumptions on voters’ capabilities are inherent in the cryptographic
protocol, and any improvements after the system is implemented will most
likely come with a change to the security model assumed in the initial scheme.
Considering usability from the beginning of the development, including getting
iterative feedback for the system prototypes from the users, would therefore help
to identify potential issues early. This feedback can furthermore be used to design
new counter-strategies that are more aligned with mental models of potential
voters.
Provide aids The counter-strategies presented above rely on the voter remem-
bering certain secrets, be it their real credential, votes cast previously in the
election, or masking value. While the voter could write them down and use as
a reference during vote casting, this could be an issue with over-the-shoulder
coercion, where the adversary can observe the whole voter environment. For such
a scenario, the secrets should be explicitly designed easy to remember (but at
the same time, not easy to guess to the adversary). The voter should furthermore
be provided with guidelines on how to remember these secrets, e.g. based on
memorisation strategies for PINs [23].
In addition to secrets individual to each voter, there is also a need to remember
the steps of counter-strategy, e.g. the rules of generating panic passwords, or
general instructions on how and when the counter-strategy can be applied. A
number of counter-strategies furthermore require the voter to perform some
calculations, such as generating a panic password according to a set list of rules,
or performing mathematical calculations, such as the XOR-function with the
masking value or the sum of all the ballots cast within election so far. Moreover,
several of these calculations also have to be performed during coercion-free voting.
As the system can only provide limited feedback, the voter will not notice if they
make a mistake in these calculations and thereby accidentally cast a ballot for a
wrong candidate.
In case the secrets such as credentials or masking values are sent to the voter
as voting materials, either via email or paper post, the voter should be able to
fake these materials in case the coercer demands access to them.
As mentioned above, aids to these fundamental components of coercion
resistant voting systems cannot be presented in an interactive way to the voter.
Furthermore, in a scenario with the physical presence of the adversary, even
non-interactive supplementary materials (e.g. paper-based instructions) cannot
be used, as the adversary will demand the voter to put them away. We therefore
propose that early in the development process, user studies are carried out in
order to align voting system specifics and requirements with voter capabilities.
The introduction of new voting systems, possibly related to new concepts such as
coercion resistance, shall be conducted by incorporating accompanying awareness
and education campaigns. One should, however, be careful in ensuring that the
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inclusion of this additional information will not overwhelm the voter or make
them distrust the system. It shall be emphasized here that previous research has
proven that voters tend to accept and manage slightly more complex processes
if this results in an increase of voting security [35]. By involving voters early in
the process and providing them continuous support throughout the election, we
mitigate the risks that come with the limited voter feedback of coercion resistant
voting systems.
Do not over-rely on technology The unrealistic assumptions of the coercion
resistant schemes show that the problem of coercion in remote voting is unlikely
to be solved only by technology. Even if a usable solution is found, it is not
guaranteed that the voter is capable of actually applying the solution, especially
given the high-stress situation of coercion. When implementing the internet
voting system, even the one that is designed to provide coercion resistance
protection, one needs to be of the limitations of such protection, and include
non-technological measures to prevent voter coercion and vote buying.
Consider implementing means for detecting coercion For some of the
counter-strategies, the information available to the election officials might reveal
some insights on whether coercion was attempted. This would include presence of
votes with invalid credentials (for the fake credentials counter-strategy), unusually
frequent vote updating (for deniable vote updating) or invalid ballots (for deniable
vote updating or masking). The concept of coercion evidence [21] was designed
to provide this feature specifically. Such a feature could be a valuable tool in
enabling the coerced voters to signal abuse to the authorities. At the same time,
it can lead to false positives, such as voters making mistakes during coercion-free
voting e.g. by entering an invalid credential, or malicious voters who misuse the
coercion detection mechanisms to undermine the legitimacy of the election and
the trust of the electoral system. One way to resolve this would be enabling to
track the potential coercion attempts back to the individual voters. In that case,
however, potential privacy issues have to be considered.
5 Conclusions
It is difficult to ensure coercion resistance in e-voting systems, as even the
solutions that propose cryptographic protocols are hard to implement in a way
that the voters are able to used them effectively. This is evidenced e.g. from the
real-world applications of Internet voting systems, where it is either assumed that
no coercion takes place (i.e. there are other safeguards in society that protect
against this), or some form of protection against coercion is implemented at
the cost of verifiability (e.g. deniable vote updating in Estonia and Norway).
Given the issues outlined in the paper, designing a practical and usable coercion
resistant scheme is a challenge.
It, however, has to be noted, that coercion cannot be fully excluded via
traditional in polling-place voting as well, including traditional paper ballots. The
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possibility of so-called ”ballot selfies”, which would be even harder to prevent
as new devices such as smart watches and other wearables that are capable
of recording and are harder to detect are becoming wide-spread. For these
reasons, Benaloh in particular argued [9] that the techniques to achieve coercion
resistance in Internet voting might be of greater help in preventing coercion than
simply relying on safety of voting booths. An important direction of future work
is therefore developing solutions for the aforementioned human factor-related
challenges, including implementations of existing cryptographic schemes, their
evaluation via empirical studies and development of new schemes that allow for
counter-strategies more suitable for practical use.
A particular challenge is to integrate the coercion resistant property with
verifiability, ensuring that the voters can also verify that their vote has been
counted correctly. Such an integration is particularly challenging, as the voter
should not be able to use the results of verification to construct a proof of how
they voted to the adversary. While a few works consider providing verifiability in
coercion resistant voting (see e.g. [49]), further investigation into the investigation
of human factors involved in ensuring both of these properties is needed.
An interesting further direction of future work is studying the perception
of the voters of risk and benefit trade-offs that come from applying coercion
resistant strategies, as well as cross-cultural studies investigating the perceptions
of these trade-offs in different societies. We furthermore did not consider other
technical issues with implementing coercion resistant systems, such as the need
to implement an untappable channel between the voter and the voting server
(see [33] for an overview and discussion of such issues), which would have to be
considered in relation to the human factors as well.
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52. Schläpfer, M., Haenni, R., Koenig, R., Spycher, O.: Efficient vote authorization in
coercion-resistant internet voting. In: International Conference on E-Voting and
Identity. pp. 71–88. Springer (2011)
53. Shirazi, F., Neumann, S., Ciolacu, I., Volkamer, M.: Robust electronic voting:
Introducing robustness in civitas. In: 2011 International Workshop on Requirements
Engineering for Electronic Voting Systems. pp. 47–55. IEEE (2011)
54. Smart, M., Ritter, E.: Remote electronic voting with revocable anonymity. In:
International Conference on Information Systems Security. pp. 39–54. Springer
(2009)
55. Smart, M., Ritter, E.: True trustworthy elections: remote electronic voting us-
ing trusted computing. In: International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted
Computing. pp. 187–202. Springer (2011)
56. Sodiya, A.S., Onashoga, S., Adelani, D.: A secure e-voting architecture. In: 2011
Eighth International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations. pp.
342–347. IEEE (2011)
57. Souheib, Y., Stephane, D., Riadh, R.: Watermarking in e-voting for large scale
election. In: 2012 International Conference on Multimedia Computing and Systems.
pp. 130–133. IEEE (2012)
16 Oksana Kulyk and Stephan Neumann
58. Spycher, O., Koenig, R., Haenni, R., Schläpfer, M.: A new approach towards
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